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Abstract: Envy is sometimes suggested as an underlying motive in the assessment of 
different economic allocations. In the theoretical literature on fair division, following 
Foley (1967), the term “envy” refers to an intrapersonal comparison of different 
consumption bundles. By contrast, in its everyday use “envy” involves interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining 
experiments on fair division problems in which inter- and intrapersonal criteria can be 
distinguished. We find that interpersonal comparisons play the dominant role. The effect 
of the intrapersonal criterion of envy-freeness is limited to situations in which other 
fairness criteria are not applicable. 
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1. Introduction 
 Interpersonal utility comparisons are commonly held to lack solid conceptual 
foundations. There are obvious problems in verifying (or even understanding) statements 
such as “I would be happier if I received good A than you would be if you received it,” or 
“I would suffer more in situation B than you in situation C.” The difficulties in making 
interpersonal utility comparisons have led economists to suggest sophisticated fairness 
criteria that do not rely on such comparisons. One such criterion is Foley’s (1967) envy 
freeness.
1
 A person is envy free if he or she does not prefer another person’s bundle of 
goods; an allocation is envy free if everybody is envy free, i.e. if nobody would be better 
off with someone else’s bundle. No interpersonal utility comparisons are necessary; each 
individual compares bundles only with respect to his or her own preferences. Envy in this 
sense has to be distinguished from the more casual use of the term in everyday language 
which refers to a feeling as expressed in “I am envious since you are better off than I am” 
– an interpersonal comparison. By contrast, envy according to Foley refers to a statement 
like “I am envious because I would be better off with what you have than with my own 
bundle” – an intrapersonal comparison. 
 The purpose of the present paper is to test the empirical relevance of envy 
freeness as an intrapersonal fairness criterion. Although there is a large experimental 
literature on fairness (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 2002 for an overview), the existing 
laboratory experiments do not allow to discriminate between interpersonal and 
intrapersonal fairness criteria.
2
 The reason is that in laboratory experiments social states 
are typically described in monetary terms, i.e. all relevant information is contained in the 
distribution of money among the participants (either in real terms or in experimental 
currency). Since all individuals are assumed to prefer more money to less, the two 
notions of envy mentioned above cannot be distinguished: someone else is better off than 
I am if and only if he or she owns something that I would prefer as well (namely, more 
money). To break this nexus we need to impose different preferences for different 
individuals. In our experiments, we endow individuals with different preferences by 
                                                 
1
 Another example is Pazner and Schmeidler’s egalitarian equivalence (see Pazner/Schmeidler,1974). 
2
 There is a tradition, following Yaari/Bar-Hillel (1984), of trying to elicit social preferences by 
questionnaires (see e.g. Konow 2003 and Gaertner 2006, Chapter 9). In this context, it is common to ask 
subjects to (hypothetically) distribute goods among individuals with different preferences. However, envy 
freeness has not been addressed in this literature either. 
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assigning different individual values to the same objects. We can thus distinguish criteria 
that are based on interpersonal comparisons, such as maximizing the welfare level of the 
worst off individual (the “maximin principle”), or minimizing the payoff difference 
(“inequality aversion”), from intrapersonal criteria such as envy freeness. To illustrate 
this, consider the following example (cf. 3PERS-1-R1 in Section 3 below). There are 
three indivisible goods A, B, C, and a fixed amount of 5 units of money to be distributed 
among three individuals 1, 2 and 3. Suppose that individual 1 considers goods A, B and C 
to be worth 45, 35, and 20 units of money, respectively. Similarly, individual 2 considers 
goods A, B and C to be worth 35, 40 and 25 money units, respectively; finally, individual 
3 considers goods A, B and C to be worth 50, 5 and 45 units of money, respectively. The 
following table summarizes these values. 
 
 A B C 
1 45 35 20 
2 35 40 25 
3 50 5 45 
 Money M=5 
 
 
In this situation, the perfectly egalitartian payoff distribution (45,45,45) can be created by 
giving good A to individual 1, good B and the 5 money units to individual 2, and good C 
to individual 3. However, individual 3 is envious since he/she would be better off with 
good A which is given to individual 1. On the other hand, envy-freeness can be achieved 
by implementing the same allocation of goods but giving the 5 units of money to 
individual 3 with a resulting (unequal) payoff distribution of (45,40,50). In this example, 
envy freeness thus makes a different recommendation than either payoff equalization or 
maximizing the payoff of the worst-off individual. 
 A potential difficulty with our approach stems from the fact that the “goods” to be 
distributed are not really consumed by the particpants but serve only as a temporary 
substitute for money. Indeed, any allocation of objects translates into a distribution of 
money in experimental currency and subjects are ultimately paid according to the total 
amounts earned during the experiment. It could therefore be argued that the distributions 
of our virtual goods are only an intermediate framing device for the different money 
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amounts ultimately consumed. This observation may weaken the role of envy freeness in 
our context since envy in the sense of Foley can only exist in the intermediate stage 
before participants are paid according to their accumulated earnings. Nevertheless, this 
does not render envy freeness irrelevant in our setting. In particular, different allocations 
of goods may induce the same payoff distribution while some of these allocations are 
envy free and others are not. The following example with five indivisible goods 
illustrates this point (see Herreiner 2007). 
 
 
 A B C D E 
1 40 2 3 25 30 
2 14 26 8 26 26 
3 10 26 26 12 26 
 
 
The allocation in which individual 1 receives good A, individual 2 receives goods B and 
D, and individual 3 receives goods C and E results in the payoff distribution (40,52,52). 
The same payoff distribution also results from the allocation in which individual 1 
receives good A, individual 2 receives goods D and E, and individual 3 receives good B 
and C. The difference between the two allocations is that the first is envy free while at the 
second allocation individual 1 would prefer individual 2’s bundle of goods to his/her own 
bundle. The example illustrates that properties of allocations such as envy freeness 
cannot be captured by a distributional preference approach that is solely based on the 
induced distribution of money. In Section 3 below, we provide evidence that in some 
cases there are indeed significant differences in the choice frequencies of different 
allocations that induce the same payoff distribution. Some of these differences can be 
attributed to envy freeness.
3
 
 Overall, however, we find that envy freeness plays a much lesser role than 
interpersonal fairness criteria. Our experimental results suggest that inequality aversion 
(i.e. a preference for more equal distributions of money) is the most important criterion 
                                                 
3
 This example (and similar ones) has been tested using a questionnaire method in Herreiner (2007) (see 
also Herreiner/Puppe (2007)). In our context with indivisible goods, there is no simpler structurally 
comparable example of two payoff-equivalent allocations of which only one is envy free. 
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that, together with Pareto optimality, characterizes most choices of allocations.
4
 The main 
conclusion from our study is, that, while interpersonal fairness criteria are dominant, 
envy freeness plays a role as a secondary criterion in situations in which Pareto 
optimality and inequality aversion are not sufficient to determine a fair allocation. 
2. Experiments and General Results 
 Our results are based on free-form bargaining experiments in which individuals 
had to agree on an allocation of several objects within a given time period. The 
experiments were conducted at the experimental lab of the University of Bonn between 
May 2001 and November 2002. The experiments took place in an anonymous lab setting 
with participants communicating exclusively via networked computers. Experiments 
lasted on average 75 minutes (including the initial instructions). Partipants were paid 
based on the allocations they agreed upon; the average payoff was €9. Participants were 
recruited by posting notices on campus. The majority of participants were economics, 
business, and law students. 50% of our participants were male/female. Each of our 204 
participants attended one session only. 
 We ran two different kinds of experiments: 2-person bargainging games and 3-
person bargaining games of which we did two different treatments in six sessions each. 
We will refer to them as 2PERS-1, 2PERS-2, 3PERS-1, and 3PERS-2 respectively. The 
2-person bargaining games ran over five rounds with individuals matched pairwise. We 
had six sessions with 8 participants each – a total of 2*6*8=96 individuals in the two 
treatments of 2PERS. The 3-person bargaining games had four rounds with individuals 
matched in groups of three. Each of the six sessions had 9 particpants – a total of 
2*6*9=108 individuals in the two treatments of 3PERS. Participants were rematched in 
every round
5
 and never interacted with the same individual(s) twice.  
                                                 
4
 Our results also provide some evidence about the trade-off between Pareto optimality and inequality 
aversion, a subject that has received some attention recently (see, among others, Charness/Rabin (2002), 
Engelmann/Strobel (2004 and 2006), Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), Fehr et. Al. (2006), Herreiner/Puppe 
(2006) and Kritikos/Bolle (2001)). 
5
 See Appendix V for the matching. – Some bargaining problems were presented in identical form in 
different rounds of the same treatment and also in different treatments. We did not see any statistically 
significant differences in behavior in those different instances of the same game. For example, rounds 2 and 
4 in 2PERS-2 have the same ordinal rankings and also the same cardinal rankings but for payoff differences 
of ±1: the same choice was made 22 (of 23) and 23 (of 24) times respectively – not a significant difference. 
The same applies when comparing either of these rounds to round 5 of 2PERS-1 – 21 (of 23) pairs chose 
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In each round, the task for the matched group of players was to agree on an allocation of 
objects within a given time limit (10 minutes in 2PERS and 12 minutes in 3PERS). The 
relevant allocation problem was presented to the players of the same group on their 
respective computer screens that also allowed them to select alloctions and exchange 
messages. On the left-hand side of the screen individuals found information about their 
own payoff and that of their matching partner(s), and about proposals.
6
 The right-hand 
side of the screen showed a box corresponding to each object; by clicking on the 
appropriate boxes individuals could distribute objects between themselves and their 
matched partner(s). A selected allocation could be sent as a proposal to the matched 
partner(s) by clicking on a “send” button. The right-hand side of the screen also provided 
a chat window, where individuals could exchange messages.
7
 All proposals and all sent 
messages were saved in a log file.  
Once the sent proposals of the group of matched players coincided, players were asked to 
confirm their choices. If all players accepted the given allocation, then the round was 
over for that group of players; otherwise the group returned to further bargaining via 
proposals and messages until they agreed or time was up. If the allotted time expired 
without an agreement, then individuals received a zero payoff for that round. If 
individuals settled on an allocation before the round’s time was up, they had to wait
8
 until 
all other groups had also finished. Payoffs of all four/five rounds were added up and paid 
out to participants at the end of the experiment. Experimental payoffs were given in 
Talers with an exchange rate of 12 Talers for DM1 in 2 PERS and 16 Talers for €1 in 
3PERS.  
 Our experiments differ from others in the fast growing literature on fairness and 
models of distributional preferences not only in the kind of division problems we 
consider but also in that we assign different payoff rankings to individuals at the 
beginning of each round. Only by assuming different preferences for different individuals 
can we distinguish envy freeness in the Foley sense from other notions of fairness. All 
distributional preference criteria discussed in other studies can be evaluated in our 
                                                                                                                                                 
the same allocation which again is not signficantly different. We therefore analyze rounds as independent 
observations. 
6
 See the instructions in Appendix III and IV for detailed screenplots. 
7
 The communication was monitored to prevent any identifiable messages from being sent. 
8
 We provided magazines for the possible waiting period.  
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experiments, too. Here, we focus on the relationship between envy freeness (EF), 
inequality aversion (IA) and Pareto optimality (PO). 
 In the 2-person bargaining games the two matched players had to distribute four 
indivisible objects between themselves. The two players had different preferences over 
the 16 possible bundles. We imposed monotonicity, i.e. subsets of bundles were worth 
less, supersets were worth more. In 2PERS-1 the payoff information in the first two 
rounds was only ordinal – individuals saw their own and their matched partner’s ranking 
of bundles but did not know the monetary values of the bundles. They knew that getting 
everything was worth 100 Talers (the experimental currency) and getting nothing was 
worth 0 Talers. In all other rounds of 2PERS-1 and 2PERS-2 the payoff information was 
cardinal, i.e. individuals knew both players’ rankings and the Taler values of the different 
bundles.
9
 The specific rankings and payoffs used in 2PERS-1 and 2PERS-2 and the 
frequency and properties of the chosen allocations are shown in Appendix I. The general 
nature of the chosen allocations in the two 2PERS treatments can be summarized
10
 as 
 
PO EF PO+EF IA 
85% 51% 39% 70% 
 
 In the 3-person bargaining games the three matched players had to distribute three 
indivisible objects and some Taler amount between themselves. In both 3PERS 
treatments all objects had to be allocated. In 3PERS-1 money could be split into any 
integer amounts and money could also be thrown away; in 3PERS-2 all money had to be 
distributed and the amount was not divisible. Payoffs for bundles (and money) were 
additive in the individual objects. The preferences imposed in 3PERS-1 and 3PERS-2 
and the allocation choices are shown in Appendix II. Analogous to the 2-person 
bargaining games the general nature of the chosen allocations in the 3-person bargaining 
games can be summarized
11
 as 
                                                 
9
 Choices are not significantly different between comparable allocations whether cardinal information was 
available in the first two rounds or not – see footnote 5. 
10
 The calculation for IA is based on rounds 3-5 of 2PERS-1 and rounds 1-5 of 2PERS-2 in which the 
cardinal rankings were known. See Herreiner/Puppe (2006) for an analysis of distributional preferences in 
the context of purely ordinal rankings. 
11
 EF counts all allocations that are either envy free or in which money is used exclusively to reduce envy. 
IA counts all allocations where the payoff difference between the richest and the poorest is the smallest 
possible. 
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PO EF PO+EF IA 
92% 31% 27% 70% 
 
It is obvious that Pareto optimality plays an important role. It is also clear that inequality 
aversion matters in many of the division problems. Envy freeness seems to be less 
important at first glance, but envy freeness does play a role on its own right. As the 
percentages in the tables above show, envy free allocations are also chosen if they are not 
Pareto optimal. In the next section, we focus on the role of envy freeness in our analysis 
in order evaluate its importance and also limitations. 
3. The Role of Envy Freeness 
 To compare outcomes in different rounds in order to isolate the effect of envy 
freeness, we rely on division problems with comparable characteristics. Rounds 4 and 5 
of 2PERS-1 and rounds 1, 2, 4, and 5 of 2PERS-2 consist of such problems. In each of 
those six division problems there are two focal allocations, both at the same ranks in the 
ordering with the higher ranked bundle two ranks above the lower ranked bundle. One of 
these two allocations is Pareto optimal and not envy free while the other is Pareto optimal 
and envy free.
 12
 The respective allocations in the different rounds are listed in the 
following table. 
 
2PERS-1-R4 2PERS-2-R1 2PERS-2-R5 2PERS-1-R5 2PERS-2-R2 2PERS-2-R4 
(AC,BD) 
(CD,AB) 
(AB,CD) 
(AD,BC) 
(AB,CD) 
(AD,BC) 
(AB,CD) 
(AD,BC) 
(AB,CD) 
(AD,BC) 
(AB,CD) 
(AD,BC) 
PO + EF ↔ large payoff difference 
PO ↔ small payoff difference 
PO + EF ↔ small payoff difference 
PO ↔ large payoff difference 
 
 
In 2PERS-1-R4, 2PERS-2-R1, and 2PERS-2-R5 the PO (and not EF) allocation is also 
the one where payoff differences are minimized at 1. In those three cases, the PO and EF 
allocation on the other hand is one where the payoff differences are fairly large at 17. In 
                                                 
12
 The alloctions shown in the second row of the above table are both PO and EF; the allocations shown in 
the third row are only PO. For all these allocations, one of the two bundles is ranked 7 and the other is 
ranked 9. The cardinal payoffs are almost identical. See Appendix I. 
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the other three cases (2PERS-1-R5, 2PERS-2-R2, 2PERS-2-R4), the situation is reversed: 
the PO and EF allocation is the one where payoff differences are minimized at 1, and the 
PO allocation that is not EF has a payoff difference of 17. We illustrate the situation 
below for the rankings of 2PERS-1-R4 on the left and 2PERS-2-R4 on the right. In the 
left situation the allocation that minimizes payoff differences is PO but not EF (allocation 
(CD,AB) at which individual 1 is envious). In the right situation the allocation that 
minimizes payoff differences is PO and EF (allocation (AB,CD)). 
 
  1  2    1  2 
  100 ABCD  ABCD 100    100 ABCD  ABCD 100 
  95 ABC  ABD 98    97 ABC  BCD 95 
1 PO 92 BCD  ACD 95    95 ACD  ABD 91 
  89 ABD  ABC 87    93 BCD  ABC 86 
  82 ACD  BCD 84    87 ABD  ACD 82 
1  60 AB  AD 64  1  60 BC  BD 64 
4 PO+EF 55 AC  AB 47  66 PO+EF 47 AB  BC 52 
1  50 BD  BC 43  2  42 CD  AC 51 
62 PO 46 CD  BD 38  0 PO 35 AD  CD 46 
1  35 AD  AC 30    33 BD  AB 32 
  28 BC  CD 27    29 AC  AD 28 
  15 B  A 17  1  9 C  B 18 
  12 C  D 11    7 A  D 17 
  7 A  B 5    6 B  C 11 
  5 D  C 4    3 D  A 6 
  0 -  - 0    0 -  - 0 
70        70       
 
 
The numbers to the left of the bundles of person 1 indicate the number of times an 
allocation (of the adjacent bundle for person 1 and the complementary bundle for person 
2) was chosen by the 72 matched pairs
13
 considered. 
 The comparison of these two situations allows us to abstract from the role of 
inequality aversion. It is obvious that inequality aversion is the primary force behind the 
choices made here. If envy freeness did not play a role, then in both situations the 
allocation with the minimal payoff difference should be chosen equally frequently – our 
null hypothesis. It is rejected based on a χ
2
-test with a p-value of 0.0423. We thus observe 
a significant difference between the two situations: the envy free allocation is chosen 
                                                 
13
 A total of 6*4=24 pairs per round with 3 rounds are considered for each situation; in both situations 2 
pairs did not reach an agreement. 
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significantly more often. Despite the preponderance of inequality aversion, the effect of 
envy freeness can be isolated: Envy freeness matters as it helps to discriminate between 
Pareto optimal allocations, 
 A similar conclusion can be drawn from the 3-person bargaining games. To test 
for envy freeness in this context, the fair division problems are constructed in such a way 
that money can be used to compensate envy or inequality. As noted above, inequality 
aversion is the dominant selection criterion here as well but envy freeness also plays a 
role in this context. The kind of division problems considered can be illustrated by the 
following example (3PERS-1-R1) 
 
 A B C 
1 45 35 20 
2 35 40 25 
3 50 5 45 
 Money m=8 
 
One focal allocation here is along the main diagonal – person 1 receives good A, person 2 
receives good B, and person 3 receives good C. However, that allocation of goods 
induces envy: person 3 prefers the good given to person 1 (good A) over his/her own 
good (good C). Focusing only on this allocation of goods along the diagonal, the 
distribution of money indicates what fairness criteria matter. The money (8 units) can be 
used to either compensate the inequality by giving at least 5 units to person 2, or to 
compensate the envy by giving at least 5 units to person 3. 
 We now present the results of the 3-player bargaining games, 3PERS-1 and 
3PERS-2.
14
 In 3PERS-1 money (m) was divisible and some or all of it could be thrown 
away.
15
 In 3PERS-2 money (M) could not be discarded, and it was indivisible to force 
individuals to give the whole amount to one individual which allows a more clear-cut test 
as to whether envy freeness matters.
16
 Each of the two treatments had two rounds with a 
                                                 
14
 Matrices are rearranged here to show all problems in a comparable format. 
15
 Some money was thrown away in 4 (of 66) cases – as can be seen in the tables where individual amounts 
do not add up to the available total. In two cases (3PERS-1-R1) money was only used to compensate payoff 
inequality but not to provide any additional payoff. In the other two cases (3PERS-1-R1 and 3PERS-1-R3) 
the same amount of money was given to all three individuals and one additional Taler was given to the 
individual with the lower payoff. 
16
 We are grateful to Gary Charness for suggesting we use indivisbile money for this very reason.  
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low degree of inequality and envy, and two rounds with a high degree of inequality and 
envy. The results for the bargaining games with a low degree of inequality and envy are 
 
 3PERS-1-R1    3PERS-1-R3    3PERS-2-R1    3PERS-2-R3  
 A B C    A B C    A B C    A B C  
1 45 35 20   1 45 35 20   1 45 25 30   1 45 15 40  
2 35 40 25   2 35 40 25   2 30 45 25   2 30 45 25  
3 50 5 45   3 50 5 45   3 50 5 45   3 50 5 45  
 m=8    m=17    M=5    M=5  
    16      17      18      17 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  3 2 1 
PO 
1 6 1 
8 
 
PO 
4 9 4 
12 
 
PO 
EF 0 0 5 
6 
 
PO 
EF 0 0 5 
11 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
 
0 5 0 
2 
 
PO 
5 7 5 
2 
 
PO 
0 5 0 
6 
 
PO 
EF 0 0 5 
4 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  3 2 1 
PO 
3 3 2 
2 
 
 
5 6 5 
1 
 
PO 
5 0 0 
4 
 
PO 
0 5 0 
1 
1 2 3  1 2 3  3 2 1  1 2 3 
PO 
3 5 0 
1 
 
PO 
6 6 5 
1 
 
PO 
0 5 0 
1 
 
PO 
0 5 0 
1 
1 2 3  1 2 3  3 1 2      
 
2 3 2 
1 
 
PO 
12 3 2 
1 
 
 
0 5 0 
1 
     
 
1 2 3               
PO 
2 4 2 
1 
 
 
   
 
     
 
     
 
2 1 3               
 
3 3 2 
1 
 
 
   
 
     
 
     
 
 
Chosen allocations are described by a goods vector in the first row and a money vector in 
the second row. The goods vector indicates which individual receives the good of that 
column (see header of matrix at top); the money vector indicates how much money is 
associated with the good of the respective column. The numbers to the right of the 
allocations indicate how frequently they were chosen. To the left of the allocations we 
specify whether the respective allocations are Pareto optimal (PO) and/or envy free (EF). 
Thus, for instance, in the first allocation in 3PERS-1-R1 shown in the table, person 1 
receives good A and 1 Taler, person 2 receives good B and 6 Talers, and person 3 
receives good C and 1 Taler; this allocation was chosen by 8 of 16 groups, and it is 
Pareto optimal but not envy free. Similarly, the last allocation in 3PERS-1-R1 assigns 
good A and 3 Talers to person 2, B and 3 Talers to person 1, and C and 2 Talers to person 
3; that allocation was chosen only once, and it is neither Pareto optimal nor envy free. 
 With divisible money (left two cases in the table above), no compensation for 
envy can be observed; for the goods allocation along the main diagonal, addressing envy 
would require more money to be given to person 3 (who prefers good A to the received 
good C) than to the other two individuals – this does not occur. With indivisible money 
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envy free allocations become the most frequently chosen, although this effect is not 
statistically significant. In particular, no significant results can be derived for 3PERS-2-
R1, even though the envy free allocation is among the most frequently chosen ones.  
In the right-most matrix (3PERS-2-R3), the main anti-diagonal allocation (3,2,1) is a 
Pareto optimal allocation that is also envy free if the money is given to person 1. This 
allocation and the other envy free allocation along the main diagonal, (1,2,3) with the 
money given to the third person are chosen much more frequently (11+4=15) than any 
other allocation. However, conclusions for envy freeness are weakened, in this case, by 
the fact that the same allocations would also have been chosen on the basis of inequality 
aversion, Pareto optimality and from a utilitarian perspective.
17
 On the other hand, for the 
allocation along the main diagonal money was assigned to person 3 significantly more 
often than to either of the other two individuals (trinomial p-value is 0.0247); the envy 
free alloction was therefore indeed chosen significantly more frequently. 
 The main anti-diagonal allocation (3,2,1) with all money being given to person 1 
seems to be particularly enticing. It is chosen almost three times as frequently as the 
allocation with the same payoffs along the main diagonal, (1,2,3), and all money being 
given to person 3 – a significant difference with a p-value of 0.0592 for a one-tailed 
binomial test. It shows very clearly that our set-up with imposed individually different 
preferences over indivisible objects and bundles is not a neutral framing for distributional 
preferences. It matters which goods are given to which individual and how the money is 
used, even if the resulting payoff distribution is the same for two different allocations.  
Comparing those two allocations with identical payoff vector and analyzing how 
money is used in relation to the goods vectors allows another possible explanation for the 
choice of the main anti-diagonal goods allocation. It seems that using money to 
compensate the worst off individual, while at the same time avoiding envy, is more 
acceptable than giving money to one of three individuals in an equitable allocation and 
thereby compensating envy; in other words, money is used to compensate inequalities, 
not to generate them, although the resulting payoff distributions are identical. This may 
suggest that procedural aspects matter if subjects perceive the allocation problem in terms 
of two separate steps of allocating first the goods and then the money. 
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 By definition, a utilitarian allocation maximizes the sum of the payoffs. 
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 The relevance of envy freeness is more obvious when the degree of inequality and 
envy is larger as is the case in the remaining examples of 3PERS: 
 
 3PERS-1-R2    3PERS-1-R4    3PERS-2-R2    3PERS-2-R4  
 A B C    A B C    A B C    A B C  
1 38 31 31   1 38 31 31   1 38 31 31   1 38 31 31  
2 33 34 33   2 33 34 33   2 33 34 33   2 31 38 31  
3 60 2 38   3 60 2 38   3 60 2 38   3 60 2 38  
 M=13    m=7    M=7    M=7  
    15      18      18      16 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  3 2 1 
PO 
3 7 3 
10 
 
PO 
1 5 1 
14 
 
PO 
0 7 0 
10 
 
PO 
EF 0 0 7 
9 
1 2 3  1 2 3  3 2 1  1 2 3 
PO 
4 5 4 
2 
 
PO 
2 3 2 
2 
 
PO 
EC 0 0 7 
4 
 
EC 
0 0 7 
3 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
PO 
5 5 3 
1 
 
PO 
EC 0 3 4 
1 
 
EC 
0 0 7 
2 
 
PO 
7 0 0 
3 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 PO 
EC 3 4 6 
1 
 
PO 
EC 1 2 4 
1 
 
PO 
7 0 0 
2 
 
PO 
0 7 0 
1 
1 2 3               
 
6 7 0 
1 
 
 
   
 
     
 
     
 
 
As before, envy freeness is basically not addressed in the left two scenarios where money 
is divisible. All chosen allocations involved the goods allocation along the main diagonal, 
i.e. good A is assigned to person 1, good B to person 2 and good C to person 3. At this 
allocation of goods, person 3 is envious since good A is worth 22 units more than person 
3’s good C. Note that the 13 respectively 7 units of money are not enough to compensate 
person 3’s envy at this goods allocation. Nevertheless, sometimes the money is used to 
reduce envy, even if not all of the afflicted person’s envy is compensated, or if some but 
less envy is induced for another person (as in 3PERS-2-R2, see discussion below). This is 
what we call “envy compensating” (EC in the table). With divisible money this occurred 
in the three (of 33) allocations along the main diagonal in which person 3 received a 
larger amount of money than person 1 (and 2). The inequality that would ensue if envy 
were compensated as much as possible (money vectors (0,0,13) and (0,0,7) for the main 
diagonal allocation) seems to be too large and therefore unacceptable. 
 In the third example above (3PERS-2-R2) where money is indivisible, inequality 
is addressed most frequently, although the level of inequality generated by assigning the 
money to person 2 is comparable to the one in the goods-only allocation (disposing 
money was not an option in 3PERS-2); all other allocations exhibit larger payoff 
differences. In the second and third allocation of 3PERS-2-R2 envy is reduced through 
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the money allocation
18
 – however with only six observations envy concerns are clearly 
less important than inequality concerns. 
 In the last example in 3PERS on the right (2-R4), money is indivisible and the 
main diagonal allocation has much less inequality than the anti-diagonal allocation. The 
main anti-diagonal allocation is envy free if the money is given to the the first person 
together with good C, whereas the main diagonal allocation can at best be envy 
compensating if the money is given to the third person along with good C – the money 
compensates scarcely ⅓ of person 3’s envy. Whether this is the decisive difference 
leading to the substantially more frequent choice of the anti-diagonal allocation as 
compared to 3PERS-2-R2 is not clear. The main anti-diagonal allocation with the money 
going to the first person is Pareto optimal, envy-free and utilitarian, whereas the main 
diagonal allocation is not Pareto optimal if the third person receives the money to reduce 
envy. Indeed, the payoff distribution corresponding to the latter allocation is (38,38,38+7) 
which is (weakly) dominated by the payoff distribution (31+7,38,60) resulting from the 
first allocation. Moreover, if the earlier point about the perceived procedural aspects of 
the allocation applies, then a relevant criterion may be whether or not money reduces or 
increases the inequality of the goods allocation – improving the worst individual’s lot 
(from 31 to 38) is clearly better in that case than introducing inequality by helping one 
individual receive more than the others (45 instead of 38). 
4. Conclusion 
 Envy freeness is a very important criterion in the theoretical fairness literature. 
We have shown here that it plays a role in indivisible goods bargaining games. However, 
its role is limited to that of a “secondary” criterion that matters only if other, less 
sophisticated critera have no discriminatory power. Notwithstanding its elegance and 
theoretical appeal, envy freeness seems to be too abstract and complicated to be 
empirically more relevant in our examples. 
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 In both cases good C is allocated together with the 7 money units. Giving them to person 1or 3 as in 
these cases, induces envy for person 2: 33+7=40 is better than the 34 associated with good B. Moreover, in 
the third allocation along the main diagonal person 3’s envy cannot be compensated entirely – giving all 7 
Talers to person 3 only reduces envy from 22 to 15. 
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 Interpersonal comparisons, on the other hand, seem to be deeply ingrained in 
human behavior no matter their lack of theoretical foundations. Individuals rely on 
distributional preferences and interpersonal comparisons even without cardinal payoff 
information as we have argued in Herreiner/Puppe (2006). Whether the reliance on 
distributional preferences depends on the specific context and division problem remains 
an open question. Fehr/Schmidt (1999) contend that distributional preferences can 
explain many hitherto startling phenomena. Given that envy freeness requires 
information only about one’s own preferences, it could conceivably be a more powerful 
criterion in situations with incomplete information. It may be worthwhile to explore the 
role of envy freeness in particular and fairness criteria in general as a function of the 
information structure of fair division problems.  
 Although our analysis provides strong evidence in support of inequality aversion 
as an empirically relevant fairness criterion, it also shows the limitations of the 
distributional preference approach. Different allocations yielding the same payoff vector 
are chosen with significantly different frequencies. It thus seems that other criteria, like 
envy freeness and/or procedural aspects matter. Bereby-Meyer/Niederle (2005) make a 
related point showing that intentionality and reciprocity matter and that they cannot be 
accounted for by distributional preferences. 
 One new and important aspect of our approach here is that we endow individuals 
with different preferences over objects to make testing for envy freeness possible. The 
results are overall not encouraging for envy freeness, although we have demonstrated that 
envy freeness matters if other, simpler criteria are not applicable. We view our study as a 
first step towards a more comprehensive analysis of interpersonal versus intrapersonal 
fairness criteria. One aspect that may be relevant in such an analysis is the versatility and 
pertinence of fairness criteria in different settings. For instance, we suspect that 
laboratory experiments by design present decision problems in a way that facilitates the 
use of interpersonal comparisons. Interpersonal comparisons are certainly much more 
complex and difficult in real-life situations.
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Appendix I:  2-Person Bargaining Games 
The tables show the goods allocation with their associated Taler payoffs. In 2PERS-1, “n.a.” indicates that 
in those two rounds participants saw only the ordinal rankings of both players, not the Taler payoffs 
corresponding to the bundles. Choice frequencies are given at the bottom of the tables along with the 
properties of the respective allocations (the relevant PO and EF allocations are shaded in dark grey, the 
comparable PO-only allocations are shaded light grey. 
 
Experiment 2PERS-1 
R1  R2  R3  R4  R5 
n.a. 1  2 n.a.  n.a. 1  2 n.a.   1  2    1  2    1  2  
100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100 
95 ABC  BCD 98  98 ABC  BCD 94  98 ABC  ABC 97  95 ABC  ABD 98  98 ABC  BCD 94 
92 ACD  ABD 95  96 ACD  ABD 90  95 ABD  ABD 96  92 BCD  ACD 95  96 ACD  ABD 90 
89 BCD  ABC 87  92 BCD  ACD 86  93 CBD  ACD 91  89 ABD  ABC 87  92 BCD  ABC 86 
82 ABD  ACD 84  88 ABD  ABC 81  83 ACD  CBD 88  82 ACD  BCD 84  88 ABD  ACD 81 
60 BC  BD 64  60 BD  CD 64  66 AB  BC 75  60 AB  AD 64  60 BC  BD 64 
55 AB  BC 47  45 AC  BC 53  57 CD  AC 45  55 AC  AB 47  45 AB  BC 53 
50 CD  AC 43  40 CD  AD 50  53 BC  BD 42  50 BD  BC 43  40 CD  AC 50 
46 AD  CD 38  36 AB  AC 44  46 AD  CD 40  46 CD  BD 38  36 AD  CD 44 
35 BD  AB 30  30 AD  BD 32  45 BD  AB 28  35 AD  AC 30  30 BD  AB 32 
28 AC  AD 27  28 BC  AB 26  20 AC  AD 19  28 BC  CD 27  28 AC  AD 26 
15 C  B 17  9 C  D 19  9 B  A 8  15 B  A 17  9 C  B 19 
12 A  D 11  8 A  B 15  5 A  B 7  12 C  D 11  8 A  D 15 
7 B  C 5  5 B  C 10  3 C  C 3  7 A  B 5  5 B  C 10 
5 D  A 4  2 D  A 7  1 D  D 2  5 D  C 4  2 D  A 7 
0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0 
                             
AB CD 10 PO EF  AB CD 10 PO   BD AC 14  EF  CD AB 21 PO   AB CD 21 PO EF 
AD BC 6 PO   BD AC 8 PO EF  AD BC 7 PO   AC BD 1 PO EF  CD AB 1   
BD AC 2    AD BC 2  EF  AB CD 2 PO EF        C ABD 1 PO  
AC BD 2 PO   BC AD 1                     
CD AB 1    AC BD 1                     
ACD B 1 PO                          
ABCD - 1 PO                          
  23      22      23      22      23   
 
Experiment 2PERS-2 
R1  R2  R3  R4  R5 
 1  2    1  2    1  2    1  2    1  2  
100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100  100 ABCD  ABCD 100 
95 ABC  BCD 98  98 ABC  BCD 94  98 ABC  ABC 97  97 ABC  BCD 95  96 ABC  BCD 97 
92 ACD  ABD 95  96 ACD  ABD 90  95 ABD  ABD 96  95 ACD  ABD 91  91 ACD  ABD 93 
89 BCD  ABC 87  92 BCD  ACD 86  93 CBD  ACD 91  93 BCD  ABC 86  90 BCD  ABC 88 
82 ABD  ACD 84  88 ABD  ABC 81  83 ACD  CBD 88  87 ABD  ACD 82  83 ABD  ACD 86 
60 BC  BD 64  60 BC  BD 64  66 AB  BC 75  60 BC  BD 64  60 BC  BD 64 
55 AB  BC 47  45 AB  BC 53  57 CD  AC 45  47 AB  BC 52  56 AB  BC 46 
50 CD  AC 43  40 CD  AC 50  53 BC  BD 42  42 CD  AC 51  52 CD  AC 41 
46 AD  CD 38  36 AD  CD 44  46 AD  CD 40  35 AD  CD 46  45 AD  CD 39 
35 BD  AB 30  30 BD  AB 32  45 BD  AB 28  33 BD  AB 32  39 BD  AB 35 
28 AC  AD 27  28 AC  AD 26  20 AC  AD 19  29 AC  AD 28  31 AC  AD 30 
15 C  B 17  9 C  D 19  9 B  A 8  9 C  B 18  14 C  B 16 
12 A  D 11  8 A  B 15  5 A  B 7  7 A  D 17  13 A  D 14 
7 B  C 5  5 B  C 10  3 C  C 3  6 B  C 11  8 B  C 7 
5 D  A 4  2 D  A 7  1 D  D 2  3 D  A 6  2 D  A 4 
0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0  0 -  - 0 
                             
AD BC 19 PO   AB CD 22 PO EF  AD BC 12 PO   AB CD 23 PO EF  AD BC 22 PO  
AB CD 2 PO EF  BC AD 1 PO   BD AC 8  EF  CD AB 1    BC AD 1 PO  
ACD B 1 PO                     AB CD 1 PO EF 
BD AC 1                           
CD AB 1                           
  24      23      20      24      24   
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Appendix II:  3-Person Bargaining Games 
 
The matrices below are rearranged to show the allocations where inequality aversion may play a role along 
the diagonals. In the experiment the columns and/or rows were arranged differently. The chosen allocations 
are indicated below the matrices. The first row of each allocation indicates which individual gets the good 
of the corresponding column; the second row indicates what money amount was added to a good. For 
instance, in round 1 of 3PERS-1 the first allocation was chosen 8 times. Here person 1 gets good A and 1 
Taler, person 2 gets good B and 6 Talers, and person 3 gets good C and 1 Taler. The last allocation was 
chosen only once; here person 2 gets good A and 3 Talers, person 1 gets good B and 3 Talers, and person 3 
gets good C and 2 Talers. 
 
Experiment 3PERS-1 
 R1    R2    R3    R4  
 A B C    A B C    A B C    A B C  
1 45 35 20   1 38 31 31   1 45 35 20   1 38 31 31  
2 35 40 25   2 33 34 33   2 35 40 25   2 33 34 33  
3 50 5 45   3 60 2 38   3 50 5 45   3 60 2 38  
 m=8    m=13    m=17    m=7  
    16      15      17      18 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
PO 
1 6 1 
8 
 
PO 
3 7 3 
10 
 
PO 
4 9 4 
12 
 
PO 
1 5 1 
14 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
 
0 5 0 
2 
 
PO 
4 5 4 
2 
 
PO 
5 7 5 
2 
 
PO 
2 3 2 
2 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
PO 
3 3 2 
2 
 
PO 
5 5 3 
1 
 
 
5 6 5 
1 
 
PO 
EC 0 3 4 
1 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
PO 
3 5 0 
1 
 
PO 
EC 3 4 6 
1 
 
PO 
6 6 5 
1 
 
PO 
EC 1 2 4 
1 
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3      
 
2 3 2 
1 
 
 
6 7 0 
1 
 
PO 
12 3 2 
1 
     
 
1 2 3               
PO 
2 4 2 
1 
 
 
   
 
     
 
     
 
2 1 3               
 
3 3 2 
1 
 
 
   
 
     
 
     
 
 
Experiment 3PERS-2 
 R1    R2    R3    R4  
 A B C    A B C    A B C    A B C  
1 45 25 30   1 38 31 31   1 45 15 40   1 38 31 31  
2 30 45 25   2 33 34 33   2 30 45 25   2 31 38 31  
3 50 5 45   3 60 2 38   3 50 5 45   3 60 2 38  
 M=5    M=7    M=5    M=7  
    18      18      17      16 
1 2 3  1 2 3  3 2 1  3 2 1 PO 
EF 0 0 5 
6 
 
PO 
0 7 0 
10 
 
PO 
EF 0 0 5 
11 
 
PO 
EF 0 0 7 
9 
1 2 3  3 2 1  1 2 3  1 2 3 
PO 
0 5 0 
6 
 
PO 
EC 0 0 7 
4 
 
PO 
EF 0 0 5 
4 
 
EC 
0 0 7 
3 
1 2 3  1 2 3  3 2 1  1 2 3 
PO 
5 0 0 
4 
 
EC 
0 0 7 
2 
 
PO 
0 5 0 
1 
 
PO 
7 0 0 
3 
3 2 1  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
PO 
0 5 0 
1 
 
PO 
7 0 0 
2 
 
PO 
0 5 0 
1 
 
PO 
0 7 0 
1 
3 1 2               
 
0 5 0 
1 
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Appendix III:  2-Person Bargaining Games 
Sample Instructions (2PERS-2) and Screenplots 
 
(The following is a translation of the German instructions – as close as possible to the German original.  
The original instructions are available upon request from the authors.) 
 
In this experiment you will repeatedly have to distribute several goods between yourself and a partner.  The 
experiment has five independent rounds, each of which you will play with a different partner.  In each 
round you will be given four goods, and you will have to agree with your partner on a distribution of these 
goods. 
 
There will be four new goods in each round.  The goods are referred to as A, B, C and D, respectively.  
You can think of any kind of object and any kind of division problem.  The goods themselves are 
indivisible, i.e. each good can either be given to you or to your partner.  All goods have a positive value.  
The more goods you receive, the better.  However, the value of the goods is different for you and your 
partner.  In each round, we give you a ranking of the bundles of goods in which the values of the bundles 
are listed in descending order.  In each round, you will be given a new ranking.  The ranking gives the 
value of each bundle of goods in Taler (T), our experimental currency.  If you agree with your partner on a 
distribution of goods, you will receive the Taler amount corresponding to your bundle of goods.  At the end 
of the experiment, these Taler amounts will be converted in Deutsche Mark (DM) and paid out to you. 
 
For example, your ranking could look as follows: 
 
 
 
In this case, your most preferred bundle consists of goods A, B, C and D; it is worth T 100.  Thus, if you 
and your partner agreed that he gets nothing and you get all four goods, then you would receive T 100.  
Your second best bundle is ABD, for which you would receive T 95 if you agreed with your partner that 
you get ABD and he gets C.  Observe that the value of bundles of goods cannot be derived from the values 
of the single goods.  For instance, good C alone is worth T 11 and good D alone is worth T 12, but both 
goods combined (CD) are worth T 55 to you.  It is also possible that a good is worth little when added to 
another bundle, e.g. the bundle ABD is worth T 95 to you and adding C increases the value of the bundle 
only to 100 (ABCD), although good C alone is worth 11. In this case, good C does not add much value to 
the bundle ABD.  The goods complement each other in different ways depending on the specific goods 
with which they are combined.  Therefore, for all evaluations in this experiment you have to look at all 
bundles of goods and not only at the values of single goods.  Your partner also gets a ranking of his 
valuations.  On the screen, you will see your partner’s ranking next to your own.  This may look as follows: 
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Please start each round by carefully looking at both rankings.  The rankings will be different in each round.  
Each round of this experiment lasts 10 minutes at most.  This time is indicated at the top right side of the 
screen and will be counted down to 0:00 during the round.  Within this time span you have to reach an 
agreement with your partner on who gets which good.  If you do not agree within 10 minutes, neither of 
you will receive anything in this round. 
 
 
 
You reach an agreement with your partner by sending him a proposal or by waiting for his proposal.  Each 
of you can make a proposal at the same time.  Your partner’s proposal appears in the top middle section 
and your own proposal appears directly beneath.  In both proposal lines, the goods you get appear in green, 
those received by your partner in red.  To make a proposal, select the goods you want to receive by clicking 
on the corresponding buttons, and then send the proposal by clicking on the “send” button. 
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You can change your proposal at any time by clicking on the A, B, C, D buttons.  Every click changes the 
color of the button and therefore moves the good from you (green) to your partner (red) or vice versa.  
Unless you send your proposal, your partner cannot see your current selection.  The most recent proposal 
you sent can be seen in your ranking on the left – your corresponding bundle is shown in a green box. 
 
 
 
Do not delay sending your proposal because your partner will otherwise not know what you propose.  You 
can change your mind at any time and send a new proposal. 
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In order to convince a partner to accept your proposal, you can exchange messages in a “chat” window at 
the bottom right by commenting on your or your partner’s proposal.  To write in the chat line (max. 80 
characters), you have to click on it with the mouse.  Press the “enter” key to send a comment.  If you want 
to leave the chat line without writing anything or without sending a comment, you have to press the “Esc” 
button.  If you want to change your proposal after having sent a comment, you will need to leave the chat 
line first. 
 
 
 
Your own comments appear in the chat terminal window with a leading “>” sign; your partner’s comments 
are shown without any additional sign at the beginning. 
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If the colors of all buttons in your proposal coincide with the colors of the buttons in your partner’s 
proposal, then you have made identical proposals.  
 
 
 
You will then be asked whether you want to accept that proposal. 
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If you and your partner select “Accept” the proposal is accepted and the round is over.  If neither or only 
one of you accepts the proposal, then the round continues, i.e. you can make new proposals or repeat old 
proposals, and chat.  A round is over either if you have both accepted a proposal or if the time limit is 
reached.  If the round has ended before the time limit, you will have to wait until the round is over for all 
other players – this will be indicated by an acoustic signal.  Then, the next round starts for everybody. 
 
 
 
At the end of each round you receive the Taler amount corresponding to your bundle of goods.  If you did 
not reach an agreement with your partner you receive no bundle of goods and therefore no Taler amount.  
The Taler amounts you received will be added over the rounds and converted into DM at the end of the 
experiment.  T 12 equal DM 1. 
 
You will play with a different player in each round of the experiment, hence you never play with someone 
you have already played with.  You and your partner do not know with whom you play; you will be 
matched anonymously.  What proposals you make, what comments you send, and what bundle of goods 
you receive in any given round has no impact on your or your partner’s ranking of bundles, or on the 
matching of partners in future rounds. 
 
Please do not mention your name and do not make any comments that could reveal your identity.  If you 
violate this rule you will receive no payment! 
 
All relevant information will appear on the screen.  A status line at the bottom of the screen indicates the 
current state of the experiment.  Before starting the experiment, you receive a number that corresponds to 
your computer terminal and you will be paid at the end based on your number. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Please switch off your cell phones for the duration of the experiment.   
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Good Luck. 
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Appendix IV: 3-Person Bargaining Games 
   Sample Instructions (3PERS-1) and Screenplots 
 
(The following is a translation of the German instructions. It is as close as possible to the original. The 
German instructions are available upon request.) 
 
In each round of this experiment you will have to distribute three goods and a money amount between you 
and two other players. You will be matched with a different group of players every round and there will be 
new goods and a new amount of money. The rounds are independent of each other. 
 
The three goods will be labeled A, B, and C; they can stand for any kind of object. The goods are 
indivisible, i.e. an object has to be given as a whole to one of the three players. You can split the money 
any way you wish as long as each individual receives an integer amount; you do not need to distribute the 
whole amount of money. 
 
At the beginning of each round you will learn what your player number is for that round, and how much 
money and how many objects there are. In the example below, you are player II in the first round. 
 
 
 
Each object has a positive value. The individuals you are matched with value objects differently from you. 
In the top center of the screen you are shown a matrix that indicates how each of you values the different 
objects. Object values are indicated in Talers – the experimental currency. In the example shown below, 
you are player II; good A has a value of 50 Talers for you, good B of 20 Talers, and good C of 30 Talers. 
Player I attaches Taler values of 60, 15, and 25 to goods A, B, and C respectively. For player III goods A 
and C have a value of 35, whereas good B has a value of 30.  
If, for instance, the three of you agree that player 1 receives good B, you, being player II, get good A, and 
player III gets good C, then player I receives 15 Talers, you have 50 Talers, and player III has 35 Talers. In 
addition to the three goods there are 5 Talers to be distributed in this round; the amount available in any 
round is shown at the top right under “Info”. Here, there are 5 Talers available. One possible allocation 
would be to give each player 1 Taler. If you agree on that division together with the object distribution just 
described, then player I would have 16, you 51, and player III 36 Talers at the end of round 1. 
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The Taler amounts received in the four rounds will be added up. At the end of the experiment, the total will 
be converted into Euros at an exchange rate of 16 Talers = 1 Euro and you will be paid the appropriate 
amount. 
 
 
 
In each round, you receive the agreed-upon amount only if you and your matching partners agree on a 
division of the objects and money before the available 12 minutes are up. Time is counted down (in 
minutes and seconds) at the right top of the screen. If the three of you do not agree within the allotted time, 
then nobody in your group receives anything for that round. Whether you agreed with your partners in 
earlier rounds and if so, what you agreed upon, has no impact on the division problems in later rounds. 
 
You should start each round by closely inspecting the payoff matrix at the top center. You reach an 
agreement on an allocation with your matching partners by exchanging proposals. Once your proposals 
conincide, you will be asked to confirm your choice. The round is over for your group if the three of you all 
confirm your choices. Otherwise you can continue bargaining with each other until you either agree or time 
is up. 
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To select an allocation you have to click on the appropriate buttons in the matrix at the top center under 
“Mein Vorschlag”. The buttons you have selected are shown in green. In the above example you are player 
II and you assigned good A to player I, good B to yourself, and good C to player III.  You can change the 
allocation by clicking on different buttons. For instance, if you now wanted to allocate good A to yourself, 
you would need to click on the button labeled “50” in column “A” and row “Spieler II”. The “50” button in 
your row will turn green, the “60” button in player I’s row in the same column will turn grey.  
To determine the Taler amounts you assign to each player, please move the cursor into the fields in the 
column “Taler” and type the amount you want to assign to a player. The money has to be split in integer 
amounts. If you try to assign more money than available, the last entry will be reduced to match the sum of 
individual amounts to the available total. You exit any field in the “Taler” column by either hitting the 
“Enter” or the “Esc” key. Hitting “Esc” sets the money amount to zero in that field. If instead you hit 
“Enter” the number you typed in will be shown. If you use a non-numeric symbol in a Taler amount field, 
then that field will be set to zero. 
 
Your matching partners will be able to see your proposals only if you send them. Also, changes you make 
to your proposal can be seen by the other players only if you send them. To send a proposal you have to 
click on the “Senden” button at the bottom of the payoff matrix. You can send a proposal only if each good 
has been assigned to one of the three players.  
On the left hand side of the screen you can see all the currently valid proposals. In the example below, 
player I’s current proposal is that player III gets all goods and 1 Taler, whereas player II (you) and player II 
agree that they want to give good A to player I, good B and 2 Talers to player II, and good C and 1 Taler to 
player III. If a player has not yet sent a proposal, all entries are zero in the appropriate matrix on the left. 
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As mentioned before, you have to agree on an allocation within 12 minutes; otherwise you receive no 
payoff for that round. You can support your proposal and comment on proposals by the other two by 
sending messages to your matching partners. 
To compose a message, move the cursor into the message field at the very bottom underneath the chat 
window. You can type up to 80 symbols at once. A message is sent once you hit the “Enter” key. If you 
want to send messages longer than 80 symbols, then compose the message row by row and send each off 
before composing the next. 
 
Messages are shown in the chat window above the message field. Each message is preceded by an 
identifier S1, S2, or S3 indicating the author of the message. 
If you do not want to send a message after all, then hit the “Esc” key to leave the message field. You can 
change your proposal in the matrix at the top only if the cursor is no longer in the message field (use “Esc” 
or “Enter” to leave the latter). 
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As soon as all three players have sent a proposal, it will be automatically checked whether they coincide. 
You will be told if that is not the case. Please confirm the message by clicking on the “Weiter” button, 
otherwise neither you will be able to make any further proposals. Hitting the “Weiter” button will delete 
your own proposal from the left matrix on your own screen (not on those of the other players). You will 
continue to see the proposals your matching partners made until they change them. The matrix at the top 
will still show your latest proposal, which you can send again by hitting the “Senden” button, or you can 
change the proposal and then send it off. Alternatively, you can first discuss the proposal with your partners 
by sending messages. The program will check whether your proposals coincide until all three players have 
either sent a new proposal or resent the old proposal. You can keep sending new and old proposals at any 
time, also if your matching partners have not yet sent a proposal or changed their latest proposal. Keep in 
mind that you have no more than 12 minutes to reach an agreement. 
 
You will be shown a message window with the proposal if you and your matching partners all sent the 
same proposal. You will be asked to confirm your choice. Choose “Akzeptieren” if you wish to confirm, 
“Ablehnen” if you do not wish to confirm the proposal.  
The proposal is accepted and the round is over if the three of you accept. If, instead, at least one of you 
rejects the proposal, then you will get a message to that effect; you will have to confirm the message by 
hitting “Weiter”.  
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Please do this asap so that you can continue bargaining. Your own last proposal will be deleted on the left 
hand side, but will still be indicated at the top. The other players’ last proposal will still be shown on the 
left. You can resend your old proposal or come up with a new one. Don’t forget to (re)send a proposal. 
Nothing will happen until each of you has sent a new or old proposal. 
 
 
 
A round is over if all groups have settled on an allocation or once time is up. If you agreed on a proposal 
before the 12 minuters are over, then you may have to wait until all other groups also reach an agreement. 
Please hit the “Weiter” button immediately once you learn that the round is over for you. You will hear a 
beep when a new round starts. 
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In each round you are matched with different individuals; you never meet the same person twice. Matching 
is anonymous; none of you knows who you are matched with. 
Please do not identify yourself in any of your messages and do not provide any other information that may 
identify you. You will not receive any payoff if you break this rule. 
 
All relevant information will be indicated on the screen during the experiment. You can check at what point 
the experiment is by following the information at the very bottom of the screen. 
You will be assigned a computer by drawing a number. You will have to return that number at the end of 
the experiment to receive your payoff. 
Any questions? 
 
Please turn of your cell phones. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Good luck. 
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Appendix V: Matching 
 
Experiment 2PERS-1 and 2PERS-2 
 
R1  R2  R3  R4  R5 
1 5  1 8  1 2  7 1  6 1 
2 6  2 5  3 4  8 2  7 2 
3 7  3 6  5 6  5 3  8 3 
4 8  4 7  7 8  6 4  5 4 
 
Experiment 3PERS-1 and 3PERS-2 
 
R1  R2  R3  R4 
1 2 3  1 4 7  1 5 9  1 6 8 
4 5 6  2 5 8  2 6 7  2 4 9 
7 8 9  3 6 9  3 4 8  3 5 7 
 
Each participant is represented by a number. Each row corresponds to a matched 
pair/group. R1 through R4 and R5, respectively, are the rounds of each session. 
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